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Firms that face organisational decline choreographed from an environmental jolt must seek 
new ways of creating opportunities in order to successfully turnaround. As such, the 
identification of pertinent turnaround strategies becomes increasingly important for senior 
management. Within the strategy-as-practice scholarly, there have been recent calls to move 
beyond empirical ‘isolationism’ and to connect with other larger social phenomena; while 
across the turnaround literature there have been calls to explore the process and microstructure 
of turnaround strategies in cyclical environments. To address this research gap, the purpose of 
the study is to adopt a tall ontology by blending the strategy-as-practice lens with the 
organisational decline and turnaround lens. By drawing on five exploratory case studies of 
large Irish construction contractors, the central objective is thus to explore firms’ turnaround 
strategising practices during an environmental jolt. In order to advance our tall ontology, we 
developed a turnaround strategising process model (and propositions) that integrates our 
findings, and which offers the fundamental building blocks of a new blended theory. We find 
that successful turnaround attempts entail the simultaneous interaction of non-aggressive cost 
retrenchment actions and non-extensive internationalisation. The case studies further suggest 
that during a prolonged environmental jolt, cost retrenchment is more often a long-term 
strategy. Lastly, the findings provide valuable support for practitioners in developing a 
successful turnaround response, and in aiding the selection and timing of operational and 
strategic actions. 
Keywords: Internationalisation, Ireland, organisational turnaround, retrenchment, strategy as 
practice 
INTRODUCTION 
The 2007 economic recession caused catastrophic upheavals across numerous industry 
environments, reflecting the most severe economic recession since the Great 
Depression of the 1930s. The challenging economic environment that unfolded sent 
unconceivable shockwaves across the construction sector (Tansey and Spillane 2014, 
Brooks et al. 2016), surpassing the command of experienced managers and 
overwhelming ever resilient firms. In this sense, the recent economic recession 
exemplifies an environmental jolt, which is a sudden and unprecedented event that 
surprises firms and often drastically changes outcomes of strategic actions (Meyer 
1982). Moreover, in an environmental jolt, the level of environmental munificence 
(level of resources available in a particular environment) tends to fluctuate 
significantly (Dess and Beard 1984). The 2007 economic recession, best exemplified 
by an interest rate increase in the United States in July 2007 (Knopp 2010), created a 
long-term pattern of contraction across the Irish construction industry; with declines in 
employment of 65% reported over a six year period (CIF 2015). According to 
Arogyaswamy and colleagues (1995), such an industry contraction-based decline 
tends to reduce the number of firms in an industry as they compete relentlessly for a 
reduced resource base. This sudden change in munificence level in the construction 
industry provides a natural experiment to investigate turnaround strategising practices 
of Irish construction firms.  
While turnaround and organisational decline scholars have predominately investigated 
turnaround situations caused from internal decline (e.g. Barker and Mone 1994, 
Barker and Duhaime 1997, Nixon et al. 2004), less is understood about turnaround 
situations during an environmental jolt, especially in the construction management 
domain. A reason for the lack of empirical work, maybe that industries in flux 
normally make unattractive research settings (Meyer et al. 1990). Nevertheless, 
Ndofor and colleagues (2013, p. 1132) recently called for scholars to ‘'examine 
potential turnaround actions in a greater number of industry environments'…'in 
industries going through cyclical contractions due to a recession'. Turnaround scholars 
have also identified a failure in capturing the dynamics of decline and recovery in 
specific industries, and more specifically, a lack of exploration into the micro-
processes of turnaround strategies (Sudarsanam and Lai 2001). Analogous with this, 
strategy-as-practice scholars have acknowledged that problems posed in mainstream 
strategy research might be aided by a practice-based approach (Jarzabkowski 2005, 
Ambrosini et al. 2007). Others have called on researchers to avoid empirical ‘micro-
isolationism’ through linking with ‘larger’ social phenomena (e.g. Seidl and 
Whittington 2014). Indeed, by blending macro and micro theoretical perspectives, 
Jarzabkowski et al. (2007) contends that this would seek to advance explanations of 
strategy making by using different levels and units of analysis. In order to address this 
research gap, the purpose of the study is to adopt a tall ontology by blending the 
strategy-as-practice micro perspective with the macro traditions of organisational 
decline and turnaround. By drawing on five exploratory case studies of large Irish 
construction contractors, the central objective is therefore to explore firms’ turnaround 
strategising practices during the period 2007 – 2015; a period of economic contraction 
and growth. Analogous with this, the sub-objectives of the study are: (1) to understand 
when, how, and why certain turnaround strategising practices occurred during the 
period; (2) to explore episodes of strategy-making within the practices of 
internationalisation and cost retrenchment; and (3) to develop a turnaround 
strategising process model and associated propositions for future testing.  
As an empirical study of turnaround strategising practices, our study makes three 
important contributions to knowledge. First, by successfully integrating macro and 
micro perspectives - organisational decline and turnaround, and strategy-as-practice 
lens - we develop the fundamental building blocks of a turnaround strategising process 
model which represents a new perspective that differs from past models. We introduce 
the concept of ‘time’ into a blended turnaround and strategy-as-practice perspective, 
and also offer an extended process model which captures the complexity of ‘time’ in 
terms of multiple practices, concurrencies and patterns. Second, by exploring the 
micro-processes of turnaround strategies we contribute to the turnaround literature by 
building on the work of Trahms et al. (2013). In so doing, we introduce the concepts 
of both internal, and external response factors - in the form of socially embedded and 
newly integrated response factors. We further conceptualise firm actions by 
introducing the concept of practice intensity, along with existing theoretical strategy-
as-practice constructs, such as, strategy-making episode, micro-level strategising 
praxis, and practice outcomes. Third, by offering unique insights into episodes of 
strategy-making during an environmental jolt, we contribute to the strategy as practice 
literature. We distinctively build on the work of Regner (2003) by illustrating 
strategy-making episodes within the practices of internationalisation and cost 
retrenchment, and also by introducing a new ‘abductive’ approach.   
In the following section, we begin by firstly reviewing the extant organisational 
decline and turnaround literature, followed by the strategy-as-practice literature. We 
then serve to move beyond micro-isolationism by uniting both theoretical 
perspectives. Moving on, we describe our research method, in the form of; research 
design, selection procedure and cases, the empirical inquiry, followed by the data 
analysis. We then present our findings using three main branches – response factors, 
firm actions, and outcomes. Under each branch, the first order findings provide a 
narrative of the turnaround strategies during the period 2007-2015. Using the strategy 
as practice lens, we then establish second order explanations of our findings, which 
help us explain in more detail how and why turnaround strategising practices 
occurred.  After detailing the findings, we offer a discussion on the respective results. 
Lastly, the conclusions are depicted, along with recommendations and avenues for 
future research.   
  
THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
Organisational Decline and the Turnaround Process 
Ruminating from the seminal works of Schendel, Patton, and Riggs (1976), Hofer 
(1980), and Bibeault (1982), is two diverging categories of theories. On the one hand, 
organisational retrenchment is seen as an integral component of the turnaround 
process (see, for example, Pearce and Robbins 1993, Trahms et al. 2013), while the 
second research stream identifies organisational retrenchment as a stand-alone tactical 
response to a decline in financial performance (see, for example, Freeman and 
Cameron 1993, DeDee and Vorbies 1998). Given that the general economy is now in 
recovery mode following the aftermath of the 2007 economic recession, the intent of 
this research is to adopt the former research stream, namely, the turnaround process. 
Regarding the constructs of ‘organisational decline’ and ‘turnaround’ we draw from 
the literature on organisational turnaround (e.g. Pearce and Robbins 1993, Barker and 
Mone 1994, Trahms et al. 2013). We follow the early lead of Schendel and colleagues 
(1976, p. 3), in defining turnaround as ‘a decline and recovery in performance’. In 
order to insure a need for strategic change, we follow McKinley, Latham and Braun’s 
(2014, p. 90) definition of organisational decline as ‘a successive year-after-year 
decrease in an organisation’s resource base than lasts for at least two years’. Indeed, 
we draw on these definitions from the turnaround literature because the respective 
definitions used in that literature is quite specific. Additionally, we emphasize that 
there is no inference that all firms experiencing decline will turn around.  
Following Bibeault’s (1982) multistage perspective of the turnaround process, 
Robbins and Pearce (1992) empirically tested a two-stage model of turnaround by 
drawing on 32 publicly held American textile manufacturing firms during the 
economic turbulence of the 1980s. They found that retrenchment was a critical first 
stage strategic element in attaining successful turnaround. Building on their original 
empirical work, Pearce and Robbins (1993) developed a two-stage turnaround 
response model which pointed to the significance of severity and causality in 
determining the turnaround response. According to the logical flow of the model, 
turnaround is a two-stage process whereby retrenchment is followed by strategic 
actions.  It was this rigid, sequential flow, and narrow scope, that was criticised by 
authors such as Barker and Mone (1994) and Arogyaswamy et al. (1995). In 
particular, Arogyaswamy et al. (1995) argued that turnaround is not time-sequential 
and thus should entail interactions (feedback loops) between stages. Building on the 
influential works of Pearse and Robbins (1993), Trahms et al. (2013) conducted a 
comprehensive review of decline and turnaround literature that occurred since 1993. 
They proposed a more compendious model (see Figure 1) by incorporating new 
additions to the turnaround process, whilst also appeasing key criticisms highlighted 
in previous turnaround debates. To this end, use of the model is warranted as it 
contains important components that will help explain how firms strategise during 
turnaround situations.  
Model of Organisational Decline and Turnaround 
Causes of Decline. This entails external and internal factors, which lead to a firm’s 
response to decline. External causes of organisational decline include changes such as 
environmental jolts (cf. Meyer 1982), technological changes, industry decline, and 
competitive dynamics. Examples of an ‘environmental jolt’ include; natural disasters, 
unexpected tax hikes, and sudden economic downturns (Venkataraman and Van de 
Ven 1998).  
Response Factors.  These factors form the interface between the causes of 
organisational decline and the actions that the firm takes to reverse the decline. The 
managerial cognitive concept (borrowed from the psychology field) entails factors 
such as; awareness of decline, attribution of decline, and perception of the decline’s 
severity, which subsequently affect the turnaround actions employed. Another trigger, 
severity of the turnaround situation, indicates how close the firm is to financial 
insolvency or break-even (Hofer 1980, Hambrick and Schecter 1983), with low 
severity usually entailing cost retrenchment, and high severity generally encompassing 
asset retrenchment (Pearce and Robbins 1993). Regarding the influence of 
stakeholders in a turnaround situation, Trahms et al. (2013) stressed that empirical 
investigation was lacking. An exception to this was the empirical research of Pajunen 
(2006). He investigated stakeholder influences on the organisational survival of a 
Finnish pulp and paper industry firm, and found that continual communication and 
fair relationships with key stakeholders enhances organisational survival. He also 
identified two critical elements of stakeholder influence in organisational survival, i.e. 
resource-dependence and network-position based powers.    
Firm Actions - strategic. Firms often pursue strategic and operational actions in 
response to organisational decline. Strategic actions are thought to be a true driver of 
long-term performance gains following decline (Trahms et al. 2013); incorporating 
changes or adjustments in a firm’s domain (Barker and Duhaime 1997, Ndofor et al. 
2013). For instance, reconfiguring existing resources and capabilities into new product 
offerings, or acquiring new resources and capabilities externally through strategic 
alliances were found to aid organisational recovery (Morrow et al. 2007). 
Diversification into new markets, both domestically and internationally, have found to 
be an important strategic response to poor financial performance (Ramanujam and 
Varadarajan 1989). Indeed, Barker and Duhaime (1997) found that extensive strategic 
reorientation during an industry contraction-based decline can be quite percarious, 
pushing a declining firm even further towards failure. This type of offensive move has 
been empirically linked to firms with organisational slack (Jenson and Meckling 1976, 
Tan and See 2004). Regarding domestic vs foreign expansion, Chen and Martin 
(2001, p.562), argued that ‘domestic expansion will delay or reduce a firm’s foreign 
expansion’.   
Even though diversification has long been a central topic of strategic management 
research, other rival theories from the international business realm, such as Dunnings 
(2003) OLI (Ownership-Location-Internalization) paradigm, potentially offer some 
useful insights and explanations regarding internationlisation. For instance, the 
framework can be used to demonstrate specific ownership, locational, and 
internalisation advantages that some firms have when competing against others in the 
international market. Indeed, a number of authors across numerous industries have 
successfully utilised the OLI paradigm in examining international business (e.g. Doh 
2005, Pheng and Hongbin 2006, Dunning and Lundan 2008). Although there are 
certain similarities between the eclectic paradigm and turnaround research (e.g. 
ownership advantages through resource availability – organisational slack), it does 
offer some alternative perpsectives. For example, in regard to choice of location, 
macro level locational factors such as government policies, regulatory barriers of 
entry, competitive intensity, as well as availability of local resources, can affect a 
firms strategic direction even during a turnaround situation. Interestingly, in a study of 
Chinese construction multinational corporations (MNCs), Pheng and Hongbin (2006) 
found the availability and costs of local workers, and the political and social stability 
in the host countries, to be some of the most important locational factors.            
Firm Actions – operational. Used as a synonym to retrenchment actions, operational 
actions focus on achieving short-run cost and asset reductions (Michael and Robbins 
1998). Often referred to as ‘stopping the bleeding’ (Bibeault 1982), these actions 
involve deliberate reductions in costs, assets and overheads of the firm as it starts its 
turnaround effort (Pearse and Robbins 1993). Robbins and Pearce (1992) argued that 
along with cost retrenchment, asset retrenchment could also be required by firms who 
encounter more severe turnaround situations. Empirical research on the effect of 
retrenchment in the turnaround process has been both conflicting and inconsistent. On 
the one hand, retrenchment is deemed an integral component in achieving recovery 
from decline (Robbins and Pearce 1992), while in contrast, turnaround success is 
attributable to revenue gains rather than cost and asset reductions (Barker and Mone 
1994). To counteract organisational decline and thus reduce firm labour costs, cost 
reducing actions can often involve employee layoffs (i.e. downsizing) and reductions 
in salaries (Barker et al. 1998, Tansey et al. 2014). Although labour costs are reduced, 
some authors have argued that excessive retrenchment actions could hinder 
turnaround attempts and subsequently have a negative effect on performance (see for 
example, Nixon et al. 2004). Aside from performance declines, there is growing 
literature on the hidden costs of organisational downsizing (Ndofor et al. 2013). For 
instance, Datta et al. (2010) argued that employee downsizing has the potential to 
disrupt relationships and social networks, and to increase employee overload and 
burnout.  
Outcomes. As Trahms and colleagues (2013) outlined in their review, there are some 
underlying issues regarding the measure of performance turnaround. There is general 
agreement that to constitute a successful recovery, performance measures should be at 
least positive (Barker and Duhaime 1997). However, there is a lack of agreement 
regarding the duration that the reversal of the decline has to last; with some arguing 
that one year is sufficient to confirm a successful turnaround (e.g. Morrow et al. 
2007), while others argue that at least three years of sustained positive performance is 
required (e.g. Barker and Duhaime 1997, Furrer et al. 2007). In this sense, we take a 
more conservative approach and classify turnaround success as a return to the same 
pre-downturn levels of performance (Pearce and Robbins 1993, Sudarsanam and Lai 
2001). To account for firms that do not fully attain ‘turnaround success’, we adopt 
Moulton and Thomas (1993) concept of ‘partial turnaround success’. In sum, to 
broaden our research on ‘firm actions’ and to move beyond generic strategies reported 
in the extant literature, we draw on the strategy-as-practice (Whittington 2006, 
Jarzabkowski et al. 2007) approach to strategy process in order to investigate the 
micro-level context of turnaround strategising practices.   
The ‘strategy-as-practice’ perspective 
Compared to turnaround research, strategy-as-practice (hereafter ‘SAP’) has more 
recent origins, emerging in particular from the theoretical work of Whittington (1996), 
and the empirical work of Jarzabkowski and Wilson (2002), and Johnson et al. (2003). 
However, the SAP approach has its theoretical roots born out of ‘theories of practice’ 
(Vaara & Whittington 2012), which can be traced back to the works of Wittgenstein 
(1951) and Heidegger (1962). By tradition, strategy theorists have viewed strategies as 
something that firms have (Whittington 2006), however, recent contemporary 
movements emphasise SAP as something that people do (e.g. Jarzabkowski 2004). 
This re-configuration towards SAP, allows scholars to achieve a deeper understanding 
of strategising in firms, as it focuses on the practices that are instigated and re-
instigated in the ‘doing’ of strategy (Rasche and Chia 2009). Emerging from more 
contemporary scholarship, the SAP perspective offers an alternative approach that is 
evidently distinct from the traditional process view (Chia and MacKay 2007). Albeit, 
strategy process studies focus on strategic decision-making as whole processes 
(Whittington 1996) and on change events from a firm-level of analysis (Paroutis and 
Pettigrew 2007); SAP research focus more on micro-activities (Whittington 1996), 
micro-processes (Brown and Duguid 2000), and on the respective routines and 
procedures entailed in endorsing strategy (Jarzabkowski and Wilson 2002).  
Strategising Conceptual Framework 
Now central to the practice tradition, the widely used strategising conceptual 
framework (see Figure 2) developed by Whittington (2006) and furthermore by 
Jarzabkowski et al. (2007), provide a canonical axiom for analysing SAP. The 
framework consists of three core and interrelated themes: practices, praxis, and 
practitioners; with strategising at its nexus. Segments A, B, and C represent 
interconnections, whereby it is not possible to examine one theme without drawing on 
the others. Following the lead of German sociologist Andreas Reckwitz (2002), 
Whittington (2006, p. 619) depicts practices as ‘shared routines of behaviour, 
including traditions, norms, and procedures for thinking, acting and using things’; 
praxis as ‘actual activity, what people do in practice’; and practitioners as ‘strategy 
actors, the strategists who both perform this activity and carry out its practices’. 
Notwithstanding the importance of all three themes, the scope of this study centres 
mainly on micro-level strategising praxis. 
Praxis. SAP research has also magnetised around praxis, typically focusing on 
episodes of strategy-making (Vaara and Whittington 2012), and investigating the 
activity ‘inside’ the process (Brown and Duguid 2001). Within a diverse set of 
approaches to theorising about praxis (e.g. capabilities, framing, etc.), our focus is 
predominately on aspects of resources and emergence; which potentially provide 
micro-level minutiae.  
Regarding the resource-based view, Salvato (2003) used a comparative case study 
approach to identify ‘core micro-strategies’ (set of resources and organisational 
routines).  These resulted from accumulated experience, and can be leveraged and 
recombined by management to achieve dynamism. In a similar vein, other SAP 
research sheds light on specific constructs of the Bower – Burgelman (hereafter ‘B-
B’) process model of strategy-making. Central to the core of the B-B model is its 
conceptualisation of strategy making as an ‘iterated process of resource allocation’ 
(Noda and Bower 1996, p. 159). For example, Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) draw on 
an exploratory longitudinal case study of a global telecommunications firm in order to 
examine how emergent strategies form. They found that influences from external 
stakeholders can be harnessed by managers to mobilise resources internally.  
Emergent strategies in SAP research have received little attention (Tsoukas 2010), 
with Vaara and Whittington (2012, p. 310) calling for further progress with regard to 
‘exploring emergence in strategy-making’. In an early study, Regnér (2003) used a 
dual longitudinal case methodology to examine how managers create and develop 
strategy in practice. They identified a strategy making dichotomy of inductive and 
deductive episodes across the periphery and centre locations respectively. Inductive 
strategy making was developed through explorative activities (e.g. trial and error, 
informal contacts) and contributed to the creation of new strategies, while deductive 
strategy making entailed an industry and exploitation focus that aligned with the 
existing strategy. He also confronted the notion of sensemaking (cf. Weick 1995), 
exploring how managers make sense of strategy. Following the initiation of strategic 
change, sensemaking processes attempt to counteract the associated uncertainty and 
enigma (Balogun and Johnson 2005). Indeed, Gioia and Chittipeddi (1991), found that 
top management initially try to ‘figure out’ strategy-relevant threats and opportunities 
before construing a vision. Analogous with this, SAP research also sheds light on the 
‘strategy as practical coping’ and ‘strategy without design’ perspectives, put forward 
by Chia and Holt (2006, 2009). Drawing from the work of philosopher Martin 
Heidegger, Chia and Holt (2006) argue that successful strategies can emerge 
unintentionally through everyday ‘practical coping’ actions, even without the 
existence of purposeful strategic plans.  
Beyond isolationism: blending turnaround and strategy-as-practice 
perspectives  
The possibility of uniting macro factors with micro factors has been recently debated 
across the organisational, management, and strategy scholarship (Barney and Felin 
2013). Many decades ago social scientists were torn between methodological 
individualism or methodological collectivism. For instance, Durkheim (1962) argued 
that the social sciences should focus on higher social and macro factors, while Simmel 
(1974) contended that the individual was the basic building block of social theories. 
More recently, Barney and Felin (2013, p139) argued that ‘to understand any 
collective phenomenon or thing, we need to understand the constituent parts that make 
it up: individuals and their social interaction’. Indeed, numerous scholars have 
successfully united diverse theoretical traditions within the strategic management 
domain. For instance, Mirabeau and Maguire (2014) developed a process model of 
emergent strategy formation, by combining Mintzberg’s (1978) model of strategy 
formation with both the B-B model and the SAP approach. Furthermore, Regnér 
(2008, 2016) conceptually demonstrated the compatibility of the SAP approach with 
the resource based view, dynamic capabilities view, and the micro-foundations 
perspective.     
In the turnaround literature, for example, Sudarsanam and Lai (2001) stressed that 
there was a need to identify turnaround strategies beyond the generic ones of 
restructuring and retrenchment, and also to explore the process and microstructure of 
such actions. They further argued that this shortfall may explain why there are large 
similarities between recovery and non-recovery firms reported in the extant 
turnaround literature. Whilst turnaround research has been previously linked to 
mechanistic views of strategy (e.g. Lim et al. 2013), its association with contemporary 
views has been non-existent (as far as we are aware). In the SAP literature, Vaara and 
Whittington (2012) have called for linkages between the strategy-as-practice approach 
and other perspectives in strategic management research. More recently, Seidl and 
Whittington (2014), have called on SAP scholars to avoid empirical ‘micro-
isolationism’, through alignment with ‘larger’ phenomena that make strategising 
activity possible (towards taller and flatter ontologies). They contend that a tall 
ontological position steers us towards typologies of how structures and systems shape 
what is going on. Considering this, it is the intent of this research to adopt a tall 
ontology, by blending the SAP micro perspective to the theoretical macro traditions of 
organisational decline and turnaround. We have adapted a blended approach since we 
are interested in understanding turnaround strategising practices, which are both 
individual and social.   
Theoretical Framework 
In the context of the foregoing discussion, we coalesce Trahm’s et al. (2013) macro 
model with Jarzabkowski’s et al. (2007) micro model, and thus move beyond 
isolationism by developing a blended theoretical framework that informs our 
empirical study (see Figure 3). The framework portrays the constructs of the 
turnaround and SAP perspectives, and more importantly, depicts the connection 
between both approaches via the strategic themes. More specifically, the ‘firm 
actions’ branch of the turnaround model can be broadened to encompass these 
strategic themes, thus moving beyond the narrow scope of actions reported in the 
extant turnaround literature. Indeed, when examining specific themes, the SAP lens 
can be utilised to explore episodes of strategy-making, thereby identifying turnaround 
strategising practices. The 10 strategic themes outlined in Figure 3 emerged from an 
extension of previous studies (Tansey et al. 2013, 2014) where initially we identified 
eight strategic themes. As part of an ongoing PhD study, these 10 themes emanated 
from a comprehensive review of 62 key empirical strategic management studies 
within the construction project management realm. These studies specifically 
examined strategies/business practices of construction firms and therefore directly 
relate to the strategic behaviour of firms in the construction industry. Of the 62 
studies, 41 empirical studies tended to group the strategies under various management 
categories or themes, such as marketing, financial, cost-cutting etc. On this basis, a 
total of 10 common strategic themes were identified from the 41 empirical studies, 
with marketing being the most frequently used theme and tendering/procurement 
being the least frequently used.  




On the assertion of the preceding discussion, the central objective of this study is to 
explore firms' turnaround strategising practices during the period 2007 - 2015. This 
time period entails periods of both recession (environmental jolt) and growth, thereby 
allowing for improved generalisability (Morrow et al. 2004). In so doing, the research 
draws on constructs from the theoretical framework (see Figure 3), including 10 
strategic themes, and two theoretical lenses: the organisational decline and turnaround 
model established by Trahms et al. (2013); and the strategising conceptual framework 
developed by Jarzabkowski et al. (2007). Indeed, Eisenhardt (1989) argued that 
increasing the theoretical scope of a study (for example, tying two phenomena 
together), can increase the conceptual level of the findings and also enhance their 
internal validity and generalisability. Although we recognise the value an 
ethnographic approach might have provided, and given that a lot of SAP studies adopt 
ethno-methodologies (which entail multiple layers of organisational members over 
time), such techniques are often resource intensive and invasive (Hendry et al. 2010, 
Jarratt and Stiles 2010). Furthermore, Balogun and colleagues (2003) highlighted 
limitations relating to the time requirement of initial trust building prior to 
implementation of such methods, while a number of others authors described, access, 
confidentially, and sensitivity issues, with an ethnographic approach (Orlikowski 
2002, Paroutis and Pettigrew 2007, Hendry et al. 2010). As a result, these limitations 
encouraged the investigation of alternate methods, namely, a case study approach. The 
case study approach was deemed appropriate for a number of reasons. First, the 
approach is most suitable when the sensitivity of the subject of study is high (Regnér 
2003), and when the subject matter is an otherwise undocumented process (Noda and 
Bower 1996). Second, case study research is particularly useful when the boundary 
between the phenomena and context is not well delineated (Yin 2014). Third, the 
approach provides an ‘in-depth’ exploration of particular occurrences of phenomenon, 
and is also suitable for the 'how' and 'why' research questions (Yin 2014, Fellows and 
Liu 2008). Fourth, several authors have successfully utilised a case study approach 
across the turnaround and SAP domains. For example, within the turnaround and 
organisational decline realm, Pajunen (2006) successfully utilised a case study 
approach to examine stakeholder influences in organisational survival. Regarding SAP 
research, Hendry et al. (2010), adopted an in-depth qualitative case study approach to 
explore how boards ‘do’ strategy. In sum, the research method adopted in this study 
consists of five exploratory case studies of large Irish construction contractors (see 
Table 1 for further case details). 
Selection Procedures and Cases  
Regarding the sampling strategy, it entailed a three-tiered selection process. Firstly, 
the selection of the cases was based on a criterion sampling strategy which aligned 
with the thresholds set out by the European Commission (2005). Here the prerequisite 
to be satisfied before a firm was contacted for participation in the study was, that it 
had to have an annual turnover in 2007 greater than €50 million, thereby deeming 
them a 'large' firm. Secondly, theoretical sampling entailed the selection of cases who 
suffered a minimum two year performance decline. Thirdly, convenience sampling 
allowed the authors to overcome low response rates in applied settings (Abowitz and 
Toole 2010), particularly given the sensitivity of the required information. Similar to 
Jarratt and Stiles (2010), leadership networks and industry connections of the 
researchers (authors) helped identify and access senior executives. The case studies 
make use of multiple sources of data (both qualitative and quantitative), derived from 
semi-structured in-depth interviews, company documents, and archival documents. 
Sources of archival data included company annual reports, annual financial 
statements, director reports, in-house documents and leaflets, general business press, 
trade journals, and the reports of market research institutions. Subsequently, this 
material was used to verify the internal information provided from the in-depth 
interviews. Regarding the selection of interviewees, the following theoretic sampling 
criteria (Strauss and Corbin 1990) was met: (a) they were 'strategists', who, for part of 
their formal role and duties, are involved in developing strategic direction (Higgs and 
Dulewicz 1998); (b) they were in a position to reveal tacit knowledge of strategising 
practices (Jarratt and Stiles 2010); and (c) they had extensive responsibility and 
experience of strategy determination. Subsequently, the selected ‘strategists’ were all 
senior management; either Chief Executive Officers (hereafter ‘CEO’), Managing 
Directors (hereafter ‘MD’), or executive directors, whom were regarded by industry 
associates as exemplars in driving strategy. Similar to the selection procedures of 
Jarratt and Stiles (2010), each ‘strategist’ represented one unit of analysis within the 
organisation setting (holistic design), however, given that each informant held their 
current ‘executive’ position for at least nine years, this enabled them to portray 
specific strategizing practices at the subunit level (embedded design).  
The Empirical Inquiry 
The semi-structured interviews, conducted by this paper’s first author, took place 
between June and September 2015, and typically lasted 1-2 hours, with some as long 
as 3 hours. The interview guide explored two keys areas – general company 
information, and turnaround strategising practices pertaining to the period 2007 - 
2015. During the initial stage of the interviews we drew on general information 
pertaining to the interviewee and the firm (e.g. experience, education, changes in core 
business, geographical spread, organisational structure, and ownership). The second 
and most prominent stage of the interview started initially by using a broad line of 
questions which were guided mainly by the strategic themes depicted in Figure 3. At 
this macro-level, recent and past strategising activities were discussed. Consistent with 
our theoretical grounding, we also used more focused questions where we drilled 
down at the micro-level into explanations of how and why specific turnaround 
strategising practices occurred (i.e. episodes of strategy-making). Given that these 
decisions and practices took place over a number of years (2007 – 2015), particular 
attention was also paid to their chronological order and respective interconnections.   
On the basis of previous empirical studies (e.g. Price 2003, Tansey et al. 2014) each 
participant taking part in the study were sent an interview protocol sheet at least one 
week prior to the interview. This gave the participants time to reflect on the recession 
which started a number of years ago, and in tandem, to collate any relevant documents 
or archival data. For transcription purposes and to allow for a consistent flow during 
the interview discussion, each interview was recorded (written agreement was 
obtained from participant's) and transcribed verbatim, yielding 77,423 words of 
information. To ensure construct validity, each transcript was returned and verified by 
the participants (Yin 2014). Where required, follow-up telephone interviews (with the 
interviewees and other senior management) were conducted in order to seek 
clarification of any instances that subsequently emerged as important.  
Data analysis 
Drawing on interview transcripts, audio files, company documents and case notes, we 
prepared five case narratives, which were then uploaded onto Computer Assisted 
Qualitative Data Analysis Software (CAQDAS). Before case study analysis was 
conducted, an analytical strategy had to be firstly developed. Accordingly, the analysis 
was guided by two general analytic strategies proposed by Yin (2014): (1) relying on 
theoretical propositions (deductive), i.e. theoretical framework, and (2) working the 
data from the ground up (inductive). This abductive approach (Blaikie 2000) was thus 
employed iteratively throughout the process. On the premise of the general analytic 
strategy for this study, the first cycle coding method adopted consisted of ‘eclectic 
coding’, which best fits as an exploratory method (Saldana 2013). At this stage, the 10 
strategic themes represented in Figure 3 were used as the sensitising concepts or 
organising categories (see Figure 4 for coding structure). Similarly, in the general 
strategic management domain a number of authors have successfully used deductive 
strategic themes/categories for coding their respective data (e.g. Burgelman 1983, 
Mirabeau and Maguire 2014). The subsequent stage entailed second cycle coding 
methods, which involve ‘some rearrangement and reclassification of coded data into 
different and even new categories’ (Saldana 2013, p. 11). During this stage, the 
detailed coding from the first cycle were then compared at a more conceptual level 
and continuously modified (Denscombe 1998). Similar to Paroutis and Pettigrew 
(2007), reference back to the turnaround and SAP literature helped us refine and 
sharpen our initial concepts, thereby resulting in the emergence of 16 categories (see 
Figure 4). The final stage in the analytical process is post-coding and pre-writing, 
which incorporates multiple categories becoming condensed into more streamlined 
categories. Here the data can be structured/processed in several ways, e.g. sequential 
order, taxonomy, tabular displays, or networks (Miles and Huberman 1984, Saldana 
2013). In this regard, tabular displays were used for presenting the data (see Table 2), 
as they tend to lead to a portrayal of important patterns of within-case similarities and 
across-case differences (Eisenhardt 1989). Given that the predominant cause of 
organisational decline was external, in the form of the 2007 economic recession 
(which in-turn caused an industry contraction-based decline), the data presented in 







After clarifying our research method, in this section we focus on turnaround 
strategising practices that were common across all the case firms (similar to analytical 
methods adopted by Dameron and Torset 2014). More specifically, Table 2 illustrates 
certain marketing, organisational/managerial, cost/asset retrenchment, and 
tendering/procurement practices which were common across the cases. However, due 
to space restrictions, the extent of the analysis under the ‘firms actions’ branch will be 
centred on two main categories: marketing (new international and domestic markets), 
and cost/asset retrenchment (cost retrenchment). Before discussing the three main 
branches (i.e. response factors, firm actions, outcomes), we firstly provide a 
chronological depiction of the turnaround strategies for the five case firms. Regarding 
the ‘firm actions’ branch, we follow a first-order and second-order analysis approach 
(similar to Gioia and Chittipeddi 1991, Paroutis and Pettigrew 2007) to present our 
findings. The first order findings provide a time-sequential narrative of the turnaround 
strategies for the five case firms during the period 2007-2015, and reveal insights 
about the development of such practices over time. Using the SAP lens, we then 
establish second order explanations of our findings, which help us explain in more 
detail how and why turnaround strategising practices were developed over time (i.e. 
episodes of strategy-making). In order to provide a chronological representation of 
firms’ turnaround strategies and turnover during the period 2007 – 2015,  we 
developed graphical plots for each of the five cases; namely, Figures 5 to 9. Under 
each figure, attention is also paid to a brief company overview.  
Case firm A is a large building and civil engineering firm that has grown steadily from 
a small Irish local builder to a well diversified, international construction firm 
operating across the UK, Europe, and the Middle East. Figure 5 illustrates a 72% 
contraction in turnover over a six year period (2007 – 2013) for Case A. Regarding 
employee numbers the firm had to reduce its workforce by 70% during the period 
2007 – 2014.    
Case firm B is a large international construction company operating within the civil 
and building sectors across Ireland, Europe, and the Middle East. Figure 6 depicts a 
51% decline in turnover over a four year period (2007 – 2011) for Case B. In relation 
to employee numbers the firm cut its workforce by 43% between the years 2008 – 
2012.   
Case firm C is a large building company operating predominately in Ireland, and more 
recently in the UK. The company has increased its sectoral presence to include; 
healthcare, education, commercial, retail, industrial, and residential. Figure 7 exhibts 
an 83% decrease in turnover over a two year period (2008 – 2010) for Case C. During 
the same period, the firm reduced its workforce by 64%.     
Case firm D is a large building company that operates within the building sector 
across Ireland, UK, and the Middle East. The company has completed a portfolio of 
projects across a number of sectors including; commercial, residential, restoration, 
industrial, pharmaceutical and healthcare. Figure 8 highlights a 79% deterioration in 
turnover over a three year period (2008 – 2011) for Case D. Regarding employee 
numbers the firm reduced its workforce by 77% between the years 2007 – 2012.   
Case firm E is a large civil engineering contractor that has grown steadily from a 
small local Irish plant hire and civil engineering firm, to a large diverse civil 
engineering contracting company. Figure 9 demonstrates a 50% contraction in 
turnover over a three year period (2009 – 2012) for Case E. During the period 2008 – 
2012, the firm had to scale down its employee numbers by 45%.   
Response Factors 
The key response factors that form the interface between the cause of decline and the 
actions taken to reverse the decline include; stakeholder influences, stakeholder 
relationships, managerial cognition, and luck (see table 2). Considering stakeholder 
influences. In our study, the case firms reported a number of changes to their pre-
recession tendering/procurement practices – actions that were mainly instigated by 
stakeholder influences. For instance, during the recession key suppliers had an 
important position and had high influence over focal organisations such as main 
contractors and subcontractors – resource dependence based influence (cf. Pajunen 
2006). Due to financial losses suffered from unpaid accounts of bankrupt construction 
firms, suppliers started demanding upfront payments directly from the main 
contractor, and thus bypassed subcontractors due to their poor credit history and 
dwindling cash flow. The Government also held an important position and exerted 
high influence by way of introducing the new Government Construction Contracts 
Committee (hereafter ‘GCCC’) contract in 2007 – network position based influence 
(cf. Pajunen 2006). This new suite of public contracts tended to exacerbate below-cost 
tendering practices, which subsequently fuelled disputes and created adversarial 
relations across the industry. Stakeholder relationships were also found to be a key 
factor in triggering certain firm actions, particularly regarding marketing practices 
(see table 2). For example, Case C exploited its existing relationships with industry 
professionals (e.g. architects and engineers) to augment diversification into the UK 
market. On the other hand, Case B availed of ready-made human resources from 
distressed firms by utilising their relational assets, and subsequently were able to 
expand into new domestic markets.    
The case firms’ perception and interpretation of the environment (i.e. managerial 
cognition) was also found to have a profound effect on the respective actions taken. 
More specifically, management’s awareness of decline and their perception of the 
declines severity, were found to have an effect on the timing and intensity of actions 
taken (see table 2). For instance, Case C, who were exposed to the collapsing property 
market (which started declining in 2007), perceived a significant decline in turnover, 
and thus were quick to initiate an aggressive retrenchment response in 2008. On the 
other hand, Case B, whose predominant market share was in civil engineering 
(approx. 67% in 2008), and whom at the time didn’t perceive the recession going 
beyond 2010, waited until 2009 to instigate a more complaisant retrenchment 
response. The findings also illustrated the importance of ‘luck’ in shaping certain firm 
actions (see table 2). Strategic opportunities can sometimes come as a surprise, and 
can be attained through the manifestation of a firm’s good fortune and luck, rather 
than its ability to anticipate and construe such opportunities (Barney 1986). For 
instance, on its diversification endeavours into the Scottish market, Case E tried in 
vain to pre-qualify with a sophisticated public client. Through good fortune and luck, 
they were approached by an Irish contractor, and subsequently were successful with 
their joint venture (hereafter ‘JV’) bid.      
Firm Actions 
Marketing 
New international markets. During the term 2007 – 2012, all cases diversified 
internationally (see Table 2); mainly into the UK, Poland, and the Middle East. What 
was particularly interesting was the time pattern of UK market entry. For instance, 
Cases A and D, who previously had some international experience, were first to 
expand in 2009; diversifying one year after suffering a sharp decline in turnover. Case 
E followed a similar pattern, diversifying into the UK market in 2010, one year into a 
declining turnover period. However, for Case E, the start of turnover decline was 
delayed until 2009 due to the longevity of large civil contracts that they had secured 
pre-recession. Interestingly, Case firm C, who suffered the steepest decline in turnover 
(83%), didn’t enter the UK market until 2012. This was partly attributable to senior 
management’s perception of the environment, and also by the fact that they focused 
all their resources on improving their market share in the public building works sector 
in Ireland. Entry into the Polish and Middle Eastern markets followed a certain pattern 
for Case A and E, with both firms entering the markets one year after their UK market 
entry. Nonetheless, diversification into the Polish market proved ill-fated for both 
firms, with both having to retract and both suffering severe financial losses. Cases A 
and E cited; payment problems, a poor dispute process, and their Polish JV partner 
going bankrupt, as reasoning behind the withdrawal actions. 
Analogous with a declining domestic construction sector, several cases described 
other reasons for diversifying, including; client led opportunities, retaining staff, 
following competitors, and future proofing the business. What was particularly 
interesting within the ‘practice’ of internationalisation, was the ‘praxis’ of how the 
case firms actually diversified into the UK market. For instance, Case E seemed to 
win small public civil contracts fairly easily, by simply siphoning through e-tenders 
for opportunities. On the other hand, gaining a foothold with a sophisticated client like 
Transport Scotland for larger projects ended up an arduous process; however, it was 
unexpectedly achieved through ‘luck’. With this particular client, the firm had 
previously tried to pre-qualify on four occasions, but was unsuccessful. Following 
initial rejection, the firm would attend the debrief meetings and thus make the 
respective changes for the next prequalification, however, another problem would 
arise. Ultimately, a large Irish contracting firm, whom had already forged relations 
with Transport Scotland (luckily pre-recession), approached Case E ‘out of the blue’ 
about a possible JV. The resulting JV partnership successfully prequalified for a large 
infrastructure project, and subsequently won the contract.  
New domestic markets. Regarding entry into new domestic markets, all of the five 
case firms seemed to be prominent in this respect (see Table 2). For example, in 
response to a declining industry, Case B quickly expanded its presence nationally in 
2008, whilst also setting up a small works division to encompass a wider project 
scope. Moreover, in order to gain expertise and knowledge in pricing mechanical and 
electrical (hereafter M&E) works, Case B set up its own services division in 2009. 
Case C also reacted to a deteriorating construction market, deciding to enter the 
evolving public sector design and build (hereafter D&B) market in 2010; a time when 
their turnover reached its lowest level. In a similar vein, Case E started to look at 
smaller public works (for example, bridge rehabilitation) once their large civil projects 
ended in 2010. Indeed, when their turnover reached its lowest level in 2012, they 
focused on the resurrected private sector, where they secured their first enabling 
works contract for an industrial project. 
Case firm B provided an interesting example regarding the ‘practice’ of domestic 
reorientation, and in particular, the ‘praxis’ of how firms actually form new divisions. 
For example, in relation to setting up their small works and services divisions, the firm 
utilised their relational assets and were quick to avail of ready-made human resources 
from a bankrupt building firm, and a bankrupt M&E firm. More specifically, one of 
the directors who had previously worked with the bankrupt building firm before the 
recession, saw this situation as an emerging opportunity, and thus employed 
management staff who had previous experience in small building works. Given that 
larger projects were tailing off, the small works division offered the firm a ‘foot in the 
door’ with new clients, particularly those with older building who were regularly 
maintaining/renovating them. Through constant environmental scanning across 
networks of stakeholders, Case B also identified the bankruptcy of an M&E firm as an 
opportunity to obtain experienced staff and thus build a new services division. As a 
result, the firm were now in a position to interrogate prices from large M&E 
contractors, and if need be, actually undertake the M&E part of the contract 
themselves.  
Cost / Asset Retrenchment 
Cost retrenchment.  All five case companies engaged in various retrenchment actions  
during the peiod 2007 – 2015 (see table 2). Case C sustained retrenchment for 8 years, 
Cases A and B for 7 years, Case D for 6 years, while Case E retrenched for just 4 
years. Due to their substantial involvement in the residential and commercial markets, 
Cases A, C and D were first to instigate cost-cutting measures in 2008. Furthermore, 
given their high exposure to the ‘bursting’ property bubble, these three firms tended to 
be more aggressive in their reductions, with all cutting employee numbers, salaries (10 
– 20% cut), bonuses, and company cars. On the other hand, Cases B and E, who were 
predominately involved in the civil engineering sector, didn’t have to activate a 
retrenchment response until a year later. Indeed, their retrenchment actions tended to 
be less aggressive than the other three firms; most likely due to the longevity of the 
large civil contracts that they had secured pre-recession, and also given their limited 
exposure to the property market. Moreover, as their large civil contracts started to 
finish in 2009 and 2010, both firms subsequently started to implement employee cuts, 
however, salary levels remained the same and were frozen until 2015. On a more 
positive note, Cases A, B, D, and E started to increase salaries for the first time in 
2015, however, no such increases were reported in Case C. Interestingly, retrenchment 
actions were reflected in the firms’ turnover and profit figures reported during this 
period.  
Depiction of ‘how’ the case firms retrenched was also evident. In view of this, the 
smaller firms (Cases C, D, and E) tended to notify staff of imminent cuts through 
contiguous methods (e.g. personal meetings), while the larger firms (Cases A and B) 
utilised their annual strategy forums to convey such measures. Case C provides an 
interesting example regarding the ‘practice’ of initial cost retrenchment. When the 
recession took hold and the turnover started declining, a swift response was made by 
the MD, directors, and the financial controller to make drastic cuts. This praxis 
entailed each director visiting every site in their region over a two week period, and 
subsequently meeting all staff members on an individual basis to communicate the 
respective retrenchment measures. These initial actions entailed a 10-20% reduction in 
salaries at all levels, a ‘selective’ 20% reduction in human resources (approx. 30-40 
staff), cuts in bonuses, and a dramatic decrease in company vehicles. Within the next 
4-6 months as projects finished, selective human resource reductions continued with 
the elimination of a layer of middle management, which included contracts managers 
and senior surveyors. For those who were lucky enough to be kept, they were demoted 
back to being a project manager or project surveyor. This resulted in a reconfiguration 
of the organisational structure, with structure following strategy, and subsequently 
with directors now having to deal directly with project managers and project surveyors 
on a site-level. In order to cope with this revised pattern of management, staff 
(survivors) had to work longer hours to deal with the respective increase in workloads. 
On foot of increasing turnover, during 2014 and 2015 the firm were in a position to 
reinstate the layer of middle management. Regarding reductions in human resources 
across all the case firms, a number of firm-clearing mechanisms were evident; initial 
wave of lay-offs, lay-offs as projects finished, temporary lay-offs, redundancies, and 
natural wastage through retirements. Even though a key objective for all the case firms 
was to try and maintain staff, Cases A, C, and D reduced employee numbers by an 
average of 70%, while Cases B and E reduced numbers by 44%. Subsequently, the 
majority of case firms reported increases in employee numbers from 2012 onwards.  
Outcomes 
During the period 2007-2015, all case firms (except Case C) underwent at least three 
consecutive years of turnover decline. Although Case C suffered turnover decline for 
only two years, its decline was the steepest recorded across all the firms (83% 
decline). In terms of profitability, the data confirmed that all cases underwent at least 
two successive years of decline. Interestingly, it was Case firm A that seemed to be 
under the most financial stress during the period; encountering simultaneous declines 
in turnover and profit for six consecutive years (2007-2013). In fact, Cases A, C, and 
D (undertook more aggressive cost and asset retrenchment) attained only ‘partial 
turnaround success’; while in contrast, Cases B and E (adopted less aggressive 
measures) achieved ‘turnaround success’ during the period 2007-2015 (see Table 2). 
More specifically, Cases A, C and D (predominately building based) reported turnover 
figures for 2015 as being 45-70% off their peak values, whilst profit levels for 2015 
were below pre-downturn levels. In contrast, Cases B and E (predominately civil 
based) reported turnover figures for 2015 as being only 18% off peak levels, whilst 
profit levels for 2015 actually exceeded pre-downturn levels.  
DISCUSSION 
Seidl and Whittington (2014) argued for protection against ‘micro-isolationism’, 
thereby extending the scope of SAP scholarly towards taller and flatter ontologies. In 
this study will have drawn on a tall ontology by linking micro-level strategising to the 
larger macro-level phenomena of organisational decline and turnaround. In so doing, 
we undertook a qualitative evaluation of the turnaround strategising practices of five 
large Irish contractors over the period 2007 – 2015. Our findings were found to 
resonate particularly well with the two theoretical lenses, and therefore offers unique 
insights into episodes of strategy-making during an environmental jolt. In particular, 
cost retrenchment was found to be the most defensive action taken, while 
internationalisation was found to be the most offensive action taken during the period. 
In order to portray the fundamental building blocks of our tall ontology, we developed 
a turnaround strategising process model (see Figure 10) that integrates our findings, 
and thereby makes notable contributions to knowledge.  
Turnaround Strategising Process Model 
The model presented in Figure 10 demonstrates the patterns and actions that firms 
undergo in achieving turnaround success or partial turnaround success during an 
environmental jolt. In brief, the case firms’ performance deteriorated in tandem with 
an industry contraction-based decline that was caused by an environmental jolt (i.e. 
2007 economic recession). In order to halt or reverse the decline, a combination of 
internal and external response factors precipitated the firm actions to be taken. Indeed, 
the adopted practices - their intensity, strategy-making episode, and subsequent micro-
level praxis - were all shaped and configured by the firms’ socially embedded 
response factors (e.g. path dependency, relationships, etc) that were formed pre-
recession, and also by the newly integrated response factors (e.g. severity situation, 
competitive position, slack resources etc) that were instigated as a result of the 
environmental jolt. Our conceptualisation of the firm actions part of the model avoids 
modelling operational and strategic reorientation practices as rigid time sequential, 
rather they are portrayed as occurring simultaneously often impacting on one another. 
In order to capture the complexity of ‘time’ in terms of multiple practices, 
concurrencies and patterns, we provide an extension to the firm actions part of the 
turnaround strategising process model in the form of Figure 11. This extended process 
model integrates both cost retrenchment and internationalisation practices. More 
specifically, during the performance decline phase, firm actions initially entailed 
decline-stemming operational actions in the form of cost retrenchment. Following the 
cost retrenchment initiation period, case firms simultaneously undertook strategic 
reorientation in the form of internationalisation. During the performance recovery 
phase, all cases managed to stem the decline and become well established in new 
international markets, thus permitting the majority of firms to cease cost retrenchment 
by 2015. Along with economic performance outcomes at the macro-level, the 
turnaround strategising process model (Figure 10) also incorporates a micro-level 
approach to practice outcomes (as recommended by Jarzabkowski et al. 2015), which 
offers an individualised, proximate result. Importantly, the model depicts the 
interrelationships and feedback loops between stages, thus underlining the high levels 
of entanglement across the elements. In sum, case firms that implemented aggressive 
cost retrenchment, and those who undertook extensive internationalisation failed to 
turnaround – achieving only partial turnaround success. The following sections focus 
on elements of the models (Figures 10 and 11) in more detail and forward propositions 
for future testing.  
Response factors 
The case data confirmed that actions taken to reverse the decline were found to be 
dependent on a number of factors including; stakeholder influences, stakeholder 
relationships, managerial cognition, and luck. These findings represent contributions 
to the turnaround domain by building on Trahms et al. (2013) model, and adding in-
depth details which have not being readily available in a turnaround context. 
Regarding managerial cognition, we illustrated the importance of managerial 
cognition in shaping turnaround strategising practices, in that, we have confirmed that 
management’s awareness of decline and their perception of the declines severity, were 
found to have a profound effect on the timing and intensity of actions taken (also 
found by Furrer et al. 2007). Given the critical role that stakeholders play in the 
turnaround process, two key dimensions emerged from the data; stakeholder 
influences, and stakeholder relationships. The case data confirmed that key suppliers 
had an important resource-dependence based influence over focal organisations, while 
government exerted high influence through network based power. These findings are 
therefore consistent with Pajunen (2006), who found the management of stakeholder 
objectives to be instrumental in accessing and controlling resource flows, thereby 
aiding firm survival. Additionally, our findings illustrate the importance of 
stakeholder relationships, which have been found to bolster the continued existence of 
firms (Oliver 1991). Some case firms for example, exploited existing stakeholder 
relationships to augment diversification actions, while other firms utilised their 
relational assets to avail of ready-made human resources from distressed firms. Our 
findings thus build on research focusing on stakeholder theory (Pajunen 2006, 
Laplume et al. 2008, Trahms et al. 2013), by illustrating how stakeholder influences 
and relationships affect and shape turnaround strategising practices. Our study also 
suggests that ‘luck’ plays a key role in shaping firm actions. For instance, we 
identified a firm’s good fortune and luck in attaining work with a sophisticated public 
client in Scotland. This relates somewhat to an evolutionary process by which some 
firms were ‘lucky’ enough to be in the right place at the right time (cf. Cockburn et al. 
2000). Through utilising the SAP micro-lens, other firm-specific (internal) response 
factors also became apparent across the cases, for example, firm size, organisational 
slack (level of resources), and path dependency. Similar factors were also suggested 
by turnaround scholars, although on separate instances. For example, Arogyaswamy et 
al. (1995) depicted ‘level of available slack resources’ as a plausible response factor, 
while Barker III and Mone (1998) found ‘firm size’ to affect the extent of strategic 
change. On this basis, it is therefore suggested that response factors form a mutually 
constitutive dichotomy of both external and internal response factors. This analysis 
may be summarised in terms of the following propositions:  
Proposition 1a: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), different combinations of internal and external response factors directly 
guide the type and intensity of practices adopted. 
Proposition 1b: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), the dynamic combination of internal and external response factors 
encompass factors that are socially embedded in the firm (those formed pre-
recession), and those that are newly integrated in the firm as a result of a prolonged 
environmental jolt.   
Firm actions   
Another contribution to the organisational decline and turnaround literature is our 
empirical illustration of the interplay and timing of operational and strategic actions, 
as depicted in Figure 11. Interestingly, the case data confirmed that the majority of 
case firms entered a performance decline phase between 2008 and 2011, and 
subsequently entered a recovery phase during the period 2011 – 2015. While the 
strength of support varied slightly across the cases, the main pattern of findings was 
that turnaround attempts benefitted from the simultaneous interaction of both 
operational and strategic actions (concurs with Arogyaswamy et al. 1995 and Trahms 
et al. 2013); rather than the rigid sequential notion put forward by Pearce and Robbins 
(1993). The case data confirmed that the two larger contractors initiated a 
retrenchment response one year after declining turnover, while the other three firms 
commenced a retrenchment response during the same year that turnover started to 
decline. This would suggest that firm size affects the speed of response, and also helps 
sustain decline (also found by Barker and Duhaime 1997). In response to the 2007 
economic recession, all case firms tended to initiate cost retrenchment measures 
during the period 2008 – 2009. Indeed, those case firms who were extensively 
involved in the residential and commercial sectors, and thus were directly exposed to 
the property crash, tended to be the first to commence cost retrenchment in 2008. On 
the other hand, those firms who were predominately involved in the civil engineering 
sector pre-recession, didn’t have to activate a retrenchment response until 2009. These 
findings are thus consistent with Michael and Robbins (1998), who found that a 
retrenchment response was best to activate the turnaround process. In the year 
following their initial retrenchment response, the majority of case firms 
simultaneously undertook strategic actions in the form of internationalisation, thereby 
shifting towards objectives of growth and development through strategic reorientation 
of the firms’ market domain. Analogous with this, the three year period (2009 – 2012) 
tended to be the most active for the case firms - in terms of new international market 
entry, and in some situations market withdrawal. During the performance recovery 
phase (2011 – 2015), all case firms managed to ‘stop the bleeding’ (Bibeault 1982) by 
maintaining a long-term retrenchment strategy. Concurrently, during this period all 
cases became well established in at least one new international market, thereby 
enabling the majority of firms to cease retrenchment activities during 2014 - 2015. 
Our findings also refute Robbins and Pearce (1992) assertion that retrenchment is 
often a short-term strategy; rather the data strongly confirms that retrenchment is more 
long-term, particularly during a severe and prolonged environmental jolt, with 
contractors maintaining cuts for an average of 6.5 years. Essentially, the 2007 global 
recession was the worst environmental jolt since the great depression of the 1930s 
(Tansey et al. 2014). This analysis may be summarised in terms of the following 
propositions:  
Proposition 2: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), retrenchment is used to activate the turnaround process. 
Proposition 3: Firms speed of retrenchment response to an industry contraction-based 
decline is dependent on firm size.   
Proposition 4a: Firms that are primarily building orientated when entering an 
environmental jolt, and who are subsequently exposed to a collapsing property 
market, are first to instigate cost retrenchment.  
Proposition 4b: Firms that are predominately involved in civil engineering works 
when entering an environmental jolt, and who are subsequently more insulated and 
protected from competitive pressures, are slower at instigating cost retrenchment.   
Proposition 5: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), the three year period following cost retrenchment initiation is the most active 
era in terms of new international market entry and exit.  
Proposition 6: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), the simultaneous interaction of both operational actions and strategic actions 
creates recovery.  
Proposition 7: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), cost retrenchment is a long-term strategy.   
Additionally, our findings contribute to the SAP literature by identifying contextually 
meaningful patterns within episodes of strategy making (similar to Jarzabkowski and 
Wilson 2002). In particular, our findings illustrate micro-level strategising praxis 
within the practice of cost retrenchment and internationalisation. To aid our discussion 
and to further supplement our models, a summary of the main findings including a 
comparison of strategic reorientation actions vs. operational actions is illustrated in 
Table 3.  
Strategic reorientation - Internationalisation. Internal response factors such as the 
level of resources and the severity situation, can sometimes pressurise firms to try and 
turn around performance quickly; often resulting in extensive strategic reorientation 
without sufficient appraisal. This was particularly evident with Case firm A, who was 
in a ‘high severity’ situation, and who undertook three large infrastructure projects in 
Poland, all at the same time. Organisational slack may also have played a part in this 
downfall, as senior management sometimes use slack to pursue their own goals and 
thus engage in inappropriate strategies such as excessive internationalisation (Jensen 
and Meckling 1976). In this case, internationalisation was inductive in nature and was 
achieved through the exploration of new markets and by sense-making (cf. Weick 
1995) on a large scale. Given the difficulty of absorbing the costs of strategic change, 
the firm had to withdraw from Poland, and as a result, suffered severe financial losses 
(€50 – €60m) that ended up pushing the declining firm closer to failure. These 
findings align with Barker and Duhaime (1997), who stressed that extensive strategic 
reorientation during an industry contraction-based decline can be quite precarious for 
declining firms, pushing them towards bankruptcy. For those firms seeking private 
building works in the UK market (e.g. Cases C and D), strategic reorientation was 
dependent a number of external response factors, predominately stakeholder 
relationships and the firm’s path dependency (cf. Teece et al. 1997). On this basis, 
diversification was abductive in nature, and was realised through the practice of 
exploiting existing relationships (deductive strategy making), and also through 
probing of the environment and exploration of new markets (inductive strategy 
making) (cf. Regnér 2003). Furthermore, praxis entailed a multitude of practitioners 
interrogating industry boundaries - scrambling to contact clients, architects, and 
professional quantity surveyors whom they had worked with before in Ireland, and 
who had diversified into the UK market also. 
On the other hand, for those firms seeking public civil works (e.g. Case E) in the UK, 
strategic reorientation was dependent on good fortune and luck. In this case, 
diversification relied more on exploratory and inductive everyday activities, which for 
instance, entailed quantity surveyors siphoning through E-tenders to identify 
opportunities. This inductive approach seemed crucial for strategy creation (also 
found by Johnson and Huff 1998); with small scale sensemaking of ‘trying-out’ 
enabling the firm to secure a stable foothold in the market. Although this was initially 
the pattern for winning smaller contracts, success regarding larger projects also 
entailed inductive strategy making. More specifically, strategy making mechanisms 
consisted of ‘informal contacts and encounters’ (cf. Regnér 2003), attained through a 
combination of luck and reputation. In this sense, the firm had built up a good 
reputation in the Scottish market (through a number of successful small projects) and 
were equally ‘lucky’ to have been approached by an established contractor with a 
view to joint venturing on a large contract. In attending closely to praxis, we 
distinctively build on the strategy making work of Regnér (2003) by illustrating that 
successful international diversification can be achieved through a combination of 
exploitation and exploration (abductive approach), or through exploration alone 
(inductive approach). This analysis may be summarised in terms of the following 
propositions:  
Proposition 8a: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), firms that are in a high severity situation with ample organisational slack, 
pursue extensive internationalisation.  
Proposition 8b: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), firms that pursue extensive internationalisation are unsuccessful in turning 
around; pushing them closer to failure.   
Proposition 9a1: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), successful internationalisation involves a cautious, well-appraised, non-
extensive strategic reorientation; which is realised through an abductive approach.  
Proposition 9a2: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), successful internationalisation involves a cautious, well-appraised, non-
extensive strategic reorientation; which is realised through an inductive approach 
involving small scale sensemaking.  
Proposition 9b: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), unsuccessful internationalisation is a result of extensive strategic 
reorientation; which is realised through an inductive approach involving large scale 
sensemaking.  
Operational – cost retrenchment. Internal response factors such as a firm’s closeness 
to break-even, and management’s perception of the decline severity, can dictate the 
aggressiveness of cost retrenchment responses. Furthermore, external response factors 
such as a firm’s main industry sector (competitive position), and its respective path 
dependency, also influence a firm’s retrenchment response. Considering this, 
aggressive cost retrenchment was evident with regard to Cases A, C and D, 
particularly given their substantial involvement in the residential and commercial 
sectors. On the other hand, Cases B and E were predominately involved in the civil 
sector, and therefore tended to be less aggressive with their retrenchment response. 
For all cases, cost retrenchment was deductive in nature, and was based on deliberate 
‘practical coping’ measures aimed specifically at reducing costs and thereby stemming 
the decline. Interestingly, firms who undertook aggressive cost retrenchment attained 
only partial turnaround success, while those who adopted less aggressive measures, 
achieved turnaround success. These findings are consistent with those of Nixon et al. 
(2004) and Pearce and Michael (1997), who also found that a serious emphasis on 
retrenchment and downsizing actions led to poorer performance. This final analysis 
may be summarised in terms of the following propositions: 
Proposition 10: Cost retrenchment during a prolonged environmental jolt (industry 
contraction-based decline) is deductive, and is achieved through deliberate practical 
coping actions aimed at stemming the decline.  
Proposition 11: During a prolonged environmental jolt (industry contraction-based 
decline), excessive levels of cost retrenchment have a negative impact on firm 
performance, and therefore hamper turnaround attempts. 
Proposition 12: Firms successfully turning around from a prolonged environmental 
jolt (industry contraction-based decline) display a combination of non-aggressive cost 
retrenchment actions and non-extensive internationalisation.  
CONCLUSIONS 
We have addressed calls in the SAP literature to extend its scholarly towards taller 
ontologies, and also calls in the turnaround literature to explore the process and 
microstructure of turnaround strategies in cyclical environments. To achieve this, we 
adopted a tall ontology by merging research on organisational decline and turnaround, 
and the strategy-as-practice perspective. More specifically, the central objective of the 
research was to explore firms’ turnaround strategising practices during the period 
2007 – 2015, by drawing on five exploratory case studies of large Irish construction 
contractors. Analogous with this, the sub-objectives of the study were: (1) to 
understand when, how, and why certain turnaround strategising practices occurred 
during the period; (2) to explore episodes of strategy-making within the practices of 
internationalisation and cost retrenchment; and (3) to develop a turnaround 
strategising process model and associated propositions for future testing.   
First, our findings reveal that the developed turnaround strategising process model 
portrayed in Figure 10 provides a solid theoretical foundation for the integration of 
both the turnaround and SAP lens, and therefore offers a new perspective which 
differs from past models. In particular, the model introduces the concept of ‘time’ into 
a blended turnaround and SAP perspective. Moreover, the extended process model 
presented in Figure 11, captures the complexity of ‘time’ in terms of multiple 
practices, concurrencies and patterns. Empirically, both models demonstrate the 
patterns and actions that firms undergo in achieving turnaround success or partial 
turnaround success during a severe and prolonged environmental jolt. Furthermore, 
our turnaround strategising process model highlights that macro and micro levels are 
indeed linked through practices, thereby confirming Seidl and Whittington’s (2014, 
p.2) notion that for tall ontologies, ‘micro-level strategizing praxis depends 
hierarchically on larger macro structures or systems’. Second, regarding contributions 
to the turnaround literature, we build on the work of Trahms et al. (2013) by exploring 
the micro-processes of turnaround strategies. In so doing, we offer new dimensions by 
introducing the concepts of both internal, and external response factors - in the form 
of socially embedded and newly integrated response factors. We further conceptualise 
firm actions by introducing the concept of practice intensity, along with existing 
theoretical SAP constructs, such as, strategy-making episode, micro-level strategising 
praxis, and practice outcomes. The main pattern of findings show that turnaround 
attempts during the period 2007-2015, benefitted best from the simultaneous 
interaction of both non-aggressive operational actions and non-extensive strategic 
reorientation. In particular, cost retrenchment was found to be the most defensive 
action taken, while internationalisation was found to be the most offensive action 
taken during the period. Indeed, the evidence seems to advocate the influence of both 
external and internal response factors in triggering actions. The findings show that 
firms who are predominately involved in civil engineering works when entering an 
environmental jolt, tend to be more insulated and protected from competitive 
pressures, and thus turnaround quicker. In contrast, firms who are primarily building 
orientated when entering a recession, and who are subsequently exposed to a 
collapsing property market, are more vulnerable, and tend to be slower to turnaround 
their performance. In response to the environmental jolt, all case firms tended to adopt 
a long-term cost retrenchment strategy (average 6.5 years); initiating retrenchment 
measures during 2008 – 2009, and ceasing retrenchment measures during 2014 – 
2015. Concurrent with the retrenchment phase, the three year period (2009 – 2012) 
following cost retrenchment initiation tended to be the most active era for the cases - 
in terms of new international market entry and in some circumstances, market exit. 
Indeed, during the performance recovery phase (2011 – 2015), all case firms managed 
to stem the decline, whilst also becoming well established in at least one new 
international market. Third, regarding contributions to the SAP literature, our research 
findings offers unique insights into episodes of strategy-making during an 
environmental jolt, thereby enabling contextually meaningful patterns to be identified. 
We distinctively build on the work of Regnér (2003), by illustrating strategy-making 
episodes within the practices of internationalisation and cost retrenchment, and also by 
introducing a new ‘abductive’ approach. Regarding strategising praxis within 
internationalisation, the five case studies have revealed that successful expansion can 
be realised through an abductive approach of exploration and exploitation, or through 
an inductive approach of exploration alone involving small scale sensemaking. In 
regard to operational actions, the practice of cost retrenchment was found to be 
deductive in nature across all the cases. On this basis, retrenchment was achieved 
through deliberate practical coping measures aimed specifically at reducing costs and 
thereby stemming the decline. Fourth, our findings also show support for other 
theories in explaining how certain turnaround strategising practices emerged. For 
instance, regarding Dunning’s (2003) OLI paradigm, ownership advantages through 
resource availability was present across some of the case firms. Indeed, other aspects 
of the OLI theory, such as macro level locational factors (e.g. government policies, 
competitive intensity) may also have influenced the case firms’ international strategic 
position. Furthermore, Chia and Holt’s (2009) emergent notion of ‘strategy without 
design’ offers alternate explanations for the findings herein. Regarding diversification 
into the UK market, strategising praxis also entailed locally embedded, unscripted, 
coping ingenuities, which encompassed forms of tacit knowing; where the 
fundamental concern for the case firms was survival.   
The investigation of turnaround strategising practices in this study has several 
limitations. First, given the restriction of the empirical data to five case firms, caution 
in making generalisations across the industry is clearly recommended. However, 
Eisenhardt (1989) argued that four to 10 cases are adequate for analytic 
generalisations. Second, the findings presented here might lack sophisticated 
psychology techniques (e.g. activity theory frameworks) which provide a platform for 
analysing more detailed human practices over time. Finally, it is acknowledged that 
our process model has some limitations, in that, alternative models may become 
apparent in an extension of this work. Although our model is based on data collected 
during a period of economic contraction and moderate growth, it is anticipated that the 
model may need to be adjusted for future changes in internal and external response 
factors as a consequence of ongoing challenges at micro and macro-environment 
levels. It could be that growth and intra-organisational development based strategies 
become dominant during such periods, thereby portraying different interactions and 
intensities of such practices. 
A number of potentially significant directions for future research have been generated 
from this study, along with some interesting and important research questions. First, 
non-aggressive cost retrenchment and non-extensive internationalisation may not be 
the only explanation for successful turnarounds reported here. Subsequent research 
could examine the possibility that some firms turned around because of their 
idiosyncratic initial conditions (cf. Cockburn et al. 2000) and/or their path 
dependencies regarding competitive positioning or accumulation of heterogeneous 
resources (cf. Barney 1991). Additionally, our proposed process model will hopefully 
encourage scholars to generate more specific and contextually sensitive theories. One 
direction beyond the scope of the paper, could be to extend the model to include 
praxis mechanisms, which could offer alternate explanations for practice success. For 
example, with regard to internationalisation, resource orchestration (cf. Sirmon et al. 
2011) and the B-B process model of strategy-making (cf. Mirabeau and Maguire 
2014) could offer potential avenues in terms of exploring resource allocation and the 
use of mobile human resources. Regarding the practical contributions of our study, the 
process models, tables of turnaround strategising practices, and propositions offered in 
this study, provide guidance to practising managers for responding to industry 
contraction-based decline. In particular, the findings provide support for the selection 
and timing of operational and strategic actions, and their respective effect on 
turnaround attempts. However, our research suggests that during an environmental 
jolt, managers should be careful not to destroy the firm’s tacit knowledge base through 
aggressive retrenchment, nor attempt excessive internationalisation in light of 
organisational slack and high severity situations.  
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Table 1 Case descriptions 
 
Case Size (Turnover 
Index) 
Sector Main Informants 
2007 2015 Position  Experience  Background 
A 100 31.4 Building / 
Civil  
Director 27 years Quantity 
Surveying 
B 38.3 31.3 Building / 
Civil  
Director 26 years Civil Engineering 
C 14.5 8.9 Building Director 20 years Civil Engineering 
D 14.4 7.8 Building Managing Director 25 years Quantity 
Surveying  
E 4.5 5.7 Civil  Director 23 years Civil Engineering  





















Table 2 Turnaround strategising practices of large Irish construction contractors 
2007 - 2015 
Response Factors Firm Actions A B C D E 
 Strategic      
SR (clients, architects/engineers), 
Managerial cognition, Luck 
Marketing      
 New international markets X X X X X 
 New domestic markets X X X X X 
 Promotional Actions:     Changed website X X X  X 
                                        New brochures   X  X 
                                        Sponsorship   X X  
 Rebranding X X    
 Business development team   X  X 
SI & SR (banks), Managerial 
cognition 
Organisational/Managerial      
 Senior appointments X X X X X 
 Restructuring  X X X X X 
 Strategic planning X X    
 New offices  X X  X 
SI & SR (banks, suppliers, clients, 
subcontractors), Managerial cognition 
Financial      
 New financial reporting/monitoring  X  X X 
 Financial health - cash reserves  X X X  
 Stringent payment practices X X X X X 
       
 Operational       
Managerial cognition 
 
Cost / Asset Retrenchment       
 Cost retrenchment:        Salaries/wages X X X X X 
                                       Employee no’s. X X X X X 
                                       Bonuses  X X X X  
                                       Cars/vehicles X  X X  
 Asset retrenchment  X X X   
SI (government, suppliers, clients, 
competitors, subcontractors), 
Managerial cognition 
Tendering / Procurement       
 Below cost tendering X X X X X 
 New joint ventures X X X  X 
 New tendering practices X X X X X 
 Changes to contract scope  X X X X 
 PPP  X X  X 
 Strengthen prequalification department  X X  X 
 Frameworks  X X X  
 D&B   X  X 
 Direct sourcing X  X X  
SI (government, clients, industry 
dynamics) 
Functional / Project Management       
 Increased emphasis on health & safety X X X  X 
 Labour force changes  X X  X 
 Risk management X X  X  
 Speed of project delivery   X X  
SI (government, clients, industry 
dynamics) 
HR / Knowledge- Learning      
 Upskilling/training X X X  X 
 Brainstorming/lessons learnt  X X  X 
 
 
Table 2 (continued) 
Response Factors Firm Actions 
 
A B C D E 
 Management conferences/roadshows X X    
 Improved mentoring / appraisal X X         
 Knowledge sharing/transfer  X X   
SI (government, clients, industry 
dynamics), SR (clients) 
Technology / Innovation      
 Building information modelling (BIM) X X X   
 New innovations  X  X X 
 New document management systems   X X X 
 Innovation project financing    X  
       
Outcomes 
Turnaround Success 
















Notes: SI = stakeholder influence. SR = stakeholder relationship.                                                                                             
All cases suffered organisational decline = 2 consecutive years of turnover and profit decline.                   
Turnaround success = profit levels in 2015 have exceeded pre-downturn levels of performance.  











































































 Figure 11 An Extended Process Model of Cost Retrenchment and 










Table 3 An overview of turnaround strategising practices  
Cause of decline  
 
Industry contraction-based decline 
Internal response 
factors 
Level of resources, firm size, severity situation, managerial cognition 
External response 
Factors 
Stakeholder relationships, luck, industry 
sector, path dependency 




Strategic reorientation Operational 
Practice 
 
Internationalisation Cost retrenchment 
Intensity 
 




B and E  C and D A A, C and D B and E 
Strategy-making 
episode  




















































Partial turnaround success Partial 
turnaround 
success 
Turnaround 
success 
 
 
 
 
